The article examines the new trends of Hungarian constitutionalism,
1. Among the controversial aspects of the "Partisan" Hungarian Constitution, criticized both by the Hungarian scholarship and the European institutions, there are some aspects regarding the sources of law 1 governed by the new Fundamental Law. In the Fundamental Law that came into force on 1 January 2012 2 there is, on the system of norms, a fi rst * Associate professor, University of Bergamo, Department of Law, via Moroni 255 -24127 Bergamo (BG), Italy. E-mail: mauro.mazza@unibg.it 1 For the importance of the system of sources of law in the study of comparative constitutional law see, in the Italian legal literature, Pizzorusso, A.: Sistema delle fonti e forma di Stato e di governo. Quaderni costituzionali, 1986, 217 ff., where the author investigates the existence of a relationship between the hierarchy of sources depending on the intensity of their legal effect and hierarchy of the state bodies according to their degree of representativeness. In general, on the primary role of the (individual) sources of law for the knowledge of public/constitutional law (of any country), see ex multis Groppi, T.-Simoncini, A.: Introduzione allo studio del diritto pubblico e delle sue fonti. Torino, 2011; Palermo, F.: La produzione giuridica e i sistemi delle fonti. In: Carrozza, P.-Di Giovine, A.-Ferrari, G. F. (eds): Diritto costituzionale comparato. Roma-Bari, 2011, 3rd ed., 819 ff; Pino, G.: La gerarchia delle fonti del diritto. Costruzione, decostruzione, ricostruzione. In: Ars interpretandi. Annuario di ermeneutica giuridica. 2011, 19 ff., who examines criteria of hierarchy and competence in the construction of the system of sources, noting that to determine the order of the rules is as important as producing them and perhaps even more. 2 See the analytical comments, relating to (also) the system of sources, of Kovács arrangement, represented by Article R, which does not seem to cause particular issues, unlike the subsequent rulings of Article T, that, however, led to severe criticism, both international and "domestic".
Article R is limited, in fact, to establish that the Fundamental Law is the essential basis of the Hungarian legal system, and that the constitutional provisions are superior to the laws passed by the National Parliament. 3 Nor does it seem innovative, in view of comparative Eastern European post-socialist law, in the fact that the third paragraph of Article R claims specifi cally that the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be construed in accordance with the statements contained in the Preamble to the Constitution. 4 Given, in fact, that the Preamble of the Constitution is inserted after the heading »Fundamental Law«, in line with what has previously been noted by a careful analysys specifi cally dedicated to a comparative perspective of the legal nature of the preambles of the constitutions of postcommunist Eastern Europe, 5 does not appear that there may be doubts about the legally mandatory and not merely political-programmatic character of the Preamble of the new Hungarian Fundamental Law. More specifi cally, by virtue of reference 6 by which the Preamble is an integral part of the Fundamental Law, and to the extent that the Preamble is placed after the naming of the Constitution, it follows that the Preamble does not have the same direct normative character 7 as the other constitutional provisions, but still exerts 3 See the fi rst paragraph of art. R. 4 See the careful analysis of the importance and role of the preambles of the constitutions of post-communist countries of Eastern Europe conducted by Kutlešić From a theoretical point of view, organic laws have a dual function, which determines a certain ambiguity of the laws themselves. On the one hand, they serve to secure the parliamentary minorities in respect of decisions that may be adopted by transient majorities.
On the other hand, organic laws are likely to determine rigidities concerning some choices of the legislature, in order to make parliamentary decisions more diffi cult to modify in the course of subsequent legislatures. 9 This margin of ambiguity, as discussed in the pages that follow, it is signifi cantly expressed in the new Hungarian constitutional order, in view of the wide use by the new Fundamental Law of the institution of cardinal laws.
The provision of Article T has been widely criticized, both internationally and by Hungarian scholars. Starting from the latter, very interesting as it allows to know the "internal" point of view, it was observed 10 that the provision introduces a kind of limitation to the realization of the democratic will, to the extent that the voters who do not approve the line of conduct of the government in offi ce can only with diffi culty obtain a change of government policy in successive legislatures, since the simple majority cannot change what was previously established by cardinal/organic laws. The discipline enacted by cardinals laws is, in fact, less fl exible than the one provided by ordinary laws. Problems arise considering that there are numerous cases in which the Fundamental Law provides the necessary adoption of a cardinal law.
Such cases are related to thirty nine areas of the legal order. 11 They are, inter alia but primarily, the fi eld of family discipline, the Fundamental Law stipulates that the marriage is 8 In Hungarian, sarkalatos törvény. 9 provided solely when the union is between man and woman, according to the third paragraph of Article L. Many aspects are related to the organization of public powers, such as the appointment of ministers and other senior civil servants, under the fourth paragraph of Article 17, and the term of offi ce of the administrative authorities responsible for regulation and control, who are appointed by the Prime Minister or, at the proposal of the same, by the President of the Republic, as well as the scope of the powers conferred to the heads of autonomous regulatory bodies, based on the provisions contained, respectively, in the second and fourth paragraph of Article 23. There are also key aspects of the judicial system, namely the organization and administration of the courts and the legal status and remuneration of judges, in accordance with the provisions in the seventh paragraph of Article 25. Are contemplated very large areas, which are indicated in Article 40 of the Constitution, i.e. the basic rules of public fi nance, the pension system and provisions for public service delivery. The cardinal laws are relating to fi nancial institutions and control, such as the provisions concerning the organization and operation of the State Audit Offi ce, in accordance with the provisions contained in the fourth paragraph of Article 43, and the operational rules regarding the Budget Council, as provided for by the fourth paragraph of Article 44. Cardinal laws are provided with respect to the supreme command of the Armed Forces, attributed to Parliament, President, National Council of Defense, Government and Minister responsible, on the basis of the Constitution and of (one or more) cardinal laws, as stipulated in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Fundamental Law, 12 and also for the rules concerning the organization and functioning of the police and national security services, as well as provisions relating to methods of espionage and intelligence agencies, according to the sixth paragraph of Article 46. Last but not least, cardinal laws are to regulate both individual and collective rights of nationalities, that of national minorities, as well as rules for the election of their self-governing bodies both local and national, pursuant to the provisions in the third paragraph of Article 29. In the Hungarian legal literature it has been criticized, in particular, the choice to regulate by cardinal laws the areas of social policy and the tax, as it addresses matters that would otherwise require an adequate degree of fl exibility.
14 The reservations expressed with regard to the constitutional discipline of cardinal laws by a part of the Hungarian doctrine are also refl ected, in an extent amplifi ed, in some important documents adopted at the international level, particularly by the Council of Europe, Venice Commission and European Parliament.
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The fi rst (chronologically) international statement to be analyzed is that of the Council of Europe, invested of the examination of three specifi c legal questions concerning the then proposed new Constitution of Hungary by the same Government of Budapest. The points 51-52 of the Opinion n. 614 of 28 March 2011 prepared by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 16 relates to the future regulation of the Hungarian Constitution about cardinal/organic laws. In the Opinion, the question concerning cardinal laws is examined in connection with the analysis of the powers of the Constitutional Court in the draft new Constitution. In particular, the Venice Commission focuses on the problem of identifying the exact scope of the cardinal laws in the system of sources of law. Must, above all, clarify whether the cardinal laws-or organic laws-are subject to judicial control of constitutionality, or if they themselves represent a benchmark for reviewing the compliance with the Constitution of ordinary laws. The Venice Commission recommends that the fi rst of the above solutions will be favourite, namely the subjection (also) of the cardinal laws to the judicial control of constitutional legality. In this case, however, a further problem lays, highlighted by the Venice Commission Opinion of March 2011. If, in fact, many fundamental aspects of the regulatory system in Hungary are regulated by organic laws, however, and not in the Constitution, it follows probably the danger of a sort of lack in constitutional review. 17 For these reasons, the Venice Commission pointed out in the 16 The Venice Commission document (available on the Internet at http:// www. venice. coe. int.) has been prepared by a special working group, composed of fi ve members. It was approved by the Venice Commission at its plenary session held in Venice from 25 to 26 March 2011. The components of the working group were the Austrian C. Grabenwarter, the German W. Hoffman-Riem, the Polish H. Suchocka, the Finnish K. Tuori and the Belgian J. Velaers. 17 In this sense it is set the fi nal step of paragraph 51 of Opinion no. 614/2011. There it is stated, also, that »An extensive use of "cardinal laws" might lead to edging in stone the subjects regulated by such laws«.
Opinion concerned that the discipline of the profi les of greatest relevance should be regulated directly in the Constitution, and not by sources of lower rank like cardinal/organic laws. This is true, the Commission concluded, for both rulings concerning the organization and functioning of the organs of the State and with regard to guarantees, and in particular the level of protection that must be constitutional, of individual rights and fundamental freedoms. 19 In paragraphs 22-27 the Opinion of the Venice Commission deals with the cardinal laws contemplated by the new Hungarian Constitutional Charter. First, the Venice Commission notes that there are over fi fty references contained in the Fundamental Law to matters to be regulated in the future by cardinal/organic laws, in addition of course to Article T where there is the defi nition of the cardinal law. The resultaccording to the Commission-is that the main aspects of the Hungarian regulatory system will henceforth be governed by cardinal/organic laws. 20 The Commission goes on to note that Hungarian cardinal laws are certainly not a unique situation in comparative law, where there are several experiences in which there are national organic laws. 21 The feature of Hungarian cardinal laws would be to make more diffi cult to change the rules that relate to specifi c matters, which are suffi ciently important to be removed from the realm of ordinary/simple laws, but at the same time need not be directly governed by constitutional rules. Ultimately, cardinal/organic laws are not of superprimary level, although for their approval (as well as for their modifi cation) is established the need for a supermajority, not less than two-thirds of the members of Parliament present.
The Venice Commission, in the Opinion under consideration, 22 recognized also that organic laws are already provided by the Hungarian constitutional law at the time of entry into force of the new Fundamental Law. However, and this is the problematic profi le that the Commission intends to highlight, the concern stems mainly from the fact that cardinals or organic laws are contemplated in the new Constitution of Hungary in an exceptionally large manner, far beyond the traditionally issues covered in comparative law by organic laws, as is the case especially for the electoral law or regulations for parliamentary procedure. 18 See paragraph 52 of the Opinion cited in the note above. 19 The Opinion no. 621/2011 is available online at the website http:// www. venice. coe. int. The members of the working group were the same already part of the working group created for the adoption of Opinion no. 614/2011 (on the latter, see above). 20 Going into detail, the Venice Commission notes that the constitutional regulation of the judicial system should be more analytical at the superprimary level, while the devolution of powers relating to the scope of legislation to be adopted with a supermajority is too extensive, that is through cardinal/organic laws. Moreover, the regulation concerning family social rights and tax law should be subtracted from the excessive intrusiveness of the cardinal laws, in order to provide greater fl exibility to the provisions relating to the areas indicated. In other words, these are areas that should be regulated by ordinary laws, approved by a simple rather than two-thirds majority. 23 In particular, is a convincing argument that of the Venice Commission for whom »Funcionality of a democratic system is rooted in its permanent ability to change. The more policy issues are transferred beyond the powers of simply majority, the less signifi cance will future elections have and the more possibilities does a two-thirds majority have of cementing its political preferences and the country's legal order«. 24 In conclusion, the Venice Commission noted that the scope of the cardinal laws appears unusually extended in the new Hungarian Constitution and so, it being understood that Member States are free to determine both the level of detail of the provisions of constitutional law that the different levels of internal legislation, 25 the Commission moves towards a desirable narrowing of areas regulated by organic laws.
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The criticisms made by the Venice Commission were specifi cally mentioned and, therefore, reiterated by the European Parliament, by the resolution on the new Hungarian Constitution, adopted 27 on 1 July 2011. In particular, in considerings L-N the resolution of the European Parliament examines Hungarian constitutional provisions concerning cardinal laws. It is noted in the resolution that the new Fundamental Law of Hungary establishes a wider use of the cardinal laws, in a manner such that their adoption can be defi ned as part of »the new Hungarian constitutional process«. 28 It added that the adoption of specifi c and detailed rules through cardinal laws is likely to »endanger the principle of democracy«, 29 because they create »more scope for a government with a two-thirds majority in order to cement our political preferences«, with the further consequence of diminished signifi cance of future elections. 30 Above all, it is the opinion of the European Parliament 31 that »the cultural, religious, socio-economic and fi nancial politics should not be fi nally determined by cardinals laws«. 32 Based on these grounds, the European Parliament resolution on the part of the examination covering the cardinal laws has, on the one hand, invited the Hungarian authorities to adopt cardinal laws that are restricted, in the largest number of cases, to contain principle provisions, i.e. to take only »the scope of the basic regulation, 23 That is, according to rules of ordinary legislation and majoritarian politics, as is said in point 24 of the Opinion. 24 Thus is stated in point 24 of the Opinion. 25 With provision, then, of the step of cardinal/organic law in addition to that of ordinary law. 26 See points 25 and 27 of the Opinion. 27 With a majority of 331 votes in favor and 274 against. 28 See the considering L, in the end. 29 See the considering M. 30 See the considering quoted in the note above. 31 Which shares the concerns expressed about this issue by the Venice Commission in the two opinions above analyzed. 32 So in considering N.
clearly defi ned«, 33 so as not to unduly constrain future choices and decisions of democratically elected governments and parliaments, while on the other hand has asked the European Commission to exercise the necessary supervision on the organic laws to be adopted, »so check that they are consistent with the EU acquis and in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with the letter and spirit of the treaties«. 34 In terms of comparison, it should be noted that there are currently legal systems of Western European countries and also of Eastern European post-communist countries that provide the organic laws. This is the case of France, where Article 46 of the Constitution of 1958 provided for the fi rst time organic laws in their modern version, 35 designed to regulate important aspects of the organization of public powers, 36 but not also the fundamental freedoms as is the case on the basis of Article 81 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which contains the 33 See point 1, lett. b), of the European Parliament's resolution. 34 See point 2 of the resolution. 35 les lois organiques. L'existence de ce lois n'est certe pas récente puisqu'elle remonte à la Constitution de 1848. Mais, les nouvelles institutions de la France leur accordent una place et un rôle qu'elles n'avaient pas jusqu'à présent. En outre, la pratique est venue renforcer les caractères spécifi ques des lois organiques«. The same author adds (ibid.) that »Il faut cependant souligner que, au-delà des divergences juridiques relatives à la défi nition de ces actes, la fonction des lois organiques reste toujours la même. L'Histoire constitutionnelle de la France, come d'ailleurs les comparaisons que l'on peut faire avec les pays étrangeres, démonstrent que les lois organiques ont une fonction constante dans l'ordonnancement juridique: compléter la constitution et en fi xer les conditions d'application«. 36 the Government may also adopt organic ordinances with equal value in terms of sources of law. 40 With regard to the organic laws of the post-authoritarian Spain, the second paragraph of Article 81 of the 1978 Constitution states that »La aprobación, modifi cación o derogación de las Leyes orgánicas exigirá mayoría absoluta del Congreso, en una votación fi nal sobre el conjunto del proyecto«. Unlike what happens in the French constitutional system, in Spain Articles 81-82 of the Constitution exclude that Parliament may authorize the Government to enact national organic texts through ordinances with the force of law.
Organic laws are also contemplated in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, after the 1989 reform, 41 as well as in Article 80 of the Greek Constitution of 1975, although in the latter case with characteristics of specialty. 42 If we now consider the Eastern European post-communist legal systems in relation to organic laws, some (probably) lesser known and (above all) most problematic aspects emerge. Areas governed by organic laws on the basis of the constitutions are more extensive than what happens in the West. This is the case, fi rst, of Albania, whose Constitution 43 of 1998 contains a very analytical framework of the organic laws, which cover large areas of national and local levels regulations. Organic laws, in fact, dictate the rules for the organization both of central state and local governments. Under Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Constitution need the reinforced support of three-fi fths of the members of Parliament (Assembly) to pass laws concerning the organization and functioning of all institutions covered by the Constitution, the provisions on the legal status of public offi cials, the organization of territorial administration of the Albanian Republic. The right to vote is governed by organic laws, in relation to the nationality requirements of citizenship, the provisions concerning elections, political and administrative, general and local, as well as the regulation of referendums. And, also, the organic laws are related to all the rules contained in the codes, legislation on the state of emergency, the granting of amnesty. 44 As one sees, there are really signifi cant areas of operation of the organic laws adopted by reinforced majority. On the other hand, both the organic laws and "normal" laws are subject, as stated by Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of Albania, to the power of the President of the Republic to postpone the bill passed in Parliament for review. By doing so, we see that, roughly in the same way that now in Hungary, in the Albanian case the organic laws are contemplated by the Constitution, cover large areas of the legal system, and also participate in some aspects of the general rules regarding the legislative process (simple or aggravated). Among the fi rst, it was the best Italian constitutional comparative doctrine to highlight that the laws of Article 81 of the Constitution of Albania should be classifi ed in »comparative category of organic laws«. 45 If we consider, then, the Croatian post-Yugoslav legal system, there are also many similarities with the Hungarian case. The Croatian post-communist Constitution was adopted on December 22, 1990 (cd Christmas Constitution, in Croatian Božićni Ustav), entered into force in 1991 46 and was subsequently amended in 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2010. It establishes, in its current wording, that are regulated by organic laws, enacted by the "supermajority" of two-thirds of the members of (unicameral) Parliament, the rights of national minorities, as well as the provisions concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, the national and local electoral systems, the organization and functioning of institutions and government agencies, public administration and the organization and powers of bodies of regional and local levels. 47 In this case, the list is perhaps shorter than that provided by the Albanian Constitution, but does not appear altogether inferior in quality to that established by the new Hungarian Constitution. Despite this, the EU accession of Croatia-scheduled for July 1, 2013
48 -does not seem to have encountered obstacles in that regard.
With regard, fi nally, to the legal system of a Central-Eastern European country that has already joined the European Union, stands the case of Romania, whose Constitution 49 of 1991 (amended in 2003) 50 provides for the level of organic laws, which are approved by the affi rmative vote of a majority of the members of each House of Parliament, while the ordinary laws are adopted by a majority of members present in the two branches of the 45 National Parliamentary Assembly. 51 The areas assigned to the jurisdiction of the organic laws are very extensive, since the third paragraph of Article 73 of the Constitution of Romania stipulates that: »Organic laws shall regulate: a) the electoral system; the organization and functioning of the Permanent Electoral Authority; b) the organization, functioning, and fi nancing of political parties; c) the statute of Deputies and Senators, the establishment of their emoluments and other rights; d) the organization and holding of referendum; e) the organization of the Government and of the Supreme Council of National Defence; f) the state of partial or total mobilization of the armed forces and the state of war; g) the state of siege and emergency; h) criminal offences, penalties, and the execution thereof; i) the granting of amnesty or collective pardon; j) the statute of public servants; k) the contentious business falling within the competence of administrative courts; l) the organization and functioning of the Superior Council of Magistracy, the courts of law, the Public Ministry, and the Court of Audit; m) the general legal status of property and inheritance; n) the general organization of education; o) the organization of local public administration, territory, as well as the general rules on local autonomy; p) the general rules covering labour relations, trade unions, employers' associations, and social protection; q) the status of national minorities in Romania; r) the general statutory rules of religious cults; s) the other fi elds for which the Constitution stipulates the enactment of organic laws«.
Constitution of 1949, 53 amended several times both before 54 the "revolutionary" events of 1989 and (with considerable intensity) after 55 those same events themselves. It is useful to remember 56 that the former Constitution provided for two types of laws, namely, the ordinary laws and special-majority laws. The latter, also called super-majority laws, were, in turn, of two types. On the one hand, there were laws to be adopted by a majority of two thirds of the members of Parliament present and, on the other hand, the laws to be approved by the super-majority of two thirds of the members of the National Parliamentary Assembly. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, 57 in the judgment no. 1 of 1999, 58 ruled that the aggravated majority established in the Constitution for the enactment of the law is not just a formal requirement of the legislative process, but constitute a special superprimary guarantee designed to protect the need of achieving broad convergence among members of Parliament as to the regulation of certain matters of particular relevance. Earlier, in the ruling no. 4 of 1993, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had held that the fact of requiring a special majority for approval of certain laws does not mean in any way creating a sort of hierarchy of fundamental rights, since organic laws are not constitutional parameter for ordinary laws. Again intervening in relation to the so-colled two-thirds laws, the Hungarian Constitutional Court decided, with the judgment no. 3 of 1997 in which are proposed to a large extent the arguments already made in the above-mentioned judgment no. 4 of 1993, that not the entire matter for which the Constitution provides the organic law should be regulated by organic law, i.e. by a law for whose approval is required the twothirds majority, but the organic law itself must ensure the direct implementation of the constitutional provision, subject to subsequent adoption of one or more ordinary laws for the discipline of detail, of course within the general framework and in accordance with the principles established by the special-majority law.
With particular reference to the, politically very signifi cant, area of fundamental rights, that means-in the opinion of the Hungarian judges of the constitutional legitimacy-that the essential aspects of fundamental rights, including guarantees for the implementation of fundamental rights as well as limits to the constitutional restrictions of fundamental rights, can only be established through the adoption of special-majority laws, whereas aspects of detail, including any additional guarantees as well as implementing "adjustments" necessitated by changed circumstances, are likely to be introduced in the same fi eld by ordinary laws. 59 Ultimately, the combined reading of decisions no. 4/1993 and no. 3/1997 of the Hungarian Constitutional Court allowed the conclusion that the regulation of fundamental rights can be shared between ordinary laws and laws to be adopted by a majority of two thirds, provided that ordinary laws do not alter or contradict the rules dictated by organic laws.
Shifting attention now from the side of constitutional adjudication to that of the Hungarian scholarship before the new Constitution in force since the beginning of 2012, the issue regarding the possibility of the control of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court of all laws passed by the National Parliament, both by a simple majority and by a reinforced majority of two thirds was fi rst successfully resolved. 60 The Hungarian scholarship of public law had also deepened, from the point of view of the hierarchy of sources of law, the relations between ordinary laws and laws for whose approval a reinforced majority is required. 61 It was observed, in particular, that the level of special-majoirty laws is hierarchically higher than that of ordinary laws, as demonstrated inter alia by the observation that while ordinary laws cannot amend the laws to be adopted by an aggravated majority of two thirds, the latter can defi nitely change ordinary laws. In any case, if a law is passed by simple majority instead of a law adopted by a reinforced majority in an area reserved to organic law, ordinary law will be considered unconstitutional because it violated the Constitution and does not, however, because it has violated the provisions of the law approved by a majority of two thirds. In the wake of doctrinal elaboration, also the constitutional jurisprudence passed from the affi rmation that ordinary laws are different from laws which must be approved by a majority of two thirds only from a procedural standpoint, to the different position according to which the special-majority laws are to be placed in the hierarchy of norms on a higher level than ordinary laws. 62 In particular, the judgment of the Constitutional Court no. 1 of 1999 explicitly stated that ordinary laws (adopted by simple majority) cannot in any way modify or repeal the super-majority laws, since the latter are compared to the fi rst in a higher position in the hierarchy of sources of law. If this happens, ordinary law would be unconstitutional, specifying that the violation of the Constitution would be in the case under consideration for failure to comply with an interposed rule. 63 Secondly, it can be observed that, in light of the comparison between the legal systems of Western and Eastern Europe made above, 68 the areas reserved by the new Hungarian Fundamental Law are especially large, and have an equal perhaps only in Romanian constitutional law.
Thirdly, the comparison with the Hungarian constitutional law before the entry into force of the Fundamental Law of 2012 shows that there was an extension of the areas reserved to the regulation by cardinal laws, since these areas were up to thirty-three in December 2011 and now, with the entry into force of the new Fundamental Law, they are thirty-nine. 69 Ultimately, though it can be certainly said that organic laws are contemplated in many constitutional systems of Western countries as well as of Eastern European post-Communist countries, is the wideness of matters reserved to cardinals laws in Hungarian legal system that presents very unusual characters, so it can be assumed, even taking account of the fi rst cardinal laws enacted, that they serve more to make it diffi cult to change in future choices of the majority, rather than to ensure minorities. 70 In this perspective, the new "partisan" Fundamental Law could also be considered a so-called core constitution (or shorter Basic Law), since the detailed regulation is and will be contained in the cardinal laws. 68 See ante, in paragraph 2. 69 70 Data available on the website of the Hungarian parliament (http:// www. mkogy. hu) allow to know that the laws, both ordinary and cardinal, have been massively voted by the majority of deputies belonging to Fidesz, sometimes with the participation of the opposition parliamentarians belonging to the far-right party Jobbik, therefore without the support of the center-left Socialist Party and the Greens.
